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CITIZENS DISUNITED 
Steven L. Winter* 
Let’s face it: Something is profoundly awry in our democracy. 
From swift-boaters to birthers; from WMDs to death panels; from 
anchor babies to fictitious beheadings in the Arizona desert; from 
Glen Beck to Newt Gingrich, our public discourse is a toxic mix of 
rumor, myth, half-truth, deliberate distortion, outright fabrication, 
guilt by loose association, and other whopping non-sequiturs. I am 
skeptical that any amount of campaign finance reform can repair this 
situation. But I am confident that to take a crude First Amendment 
crowbar to the only levee that keeps the surge of corporate funding 
from the maelstrom of modern mass media culture is to court 
disaster. 
To think otherwise, you would have to have your head firmly 
ensconced in a First Amendment bubble circa 1973, when lunch 
counter sit-ins, civil rights marches, and anti-war demonstrations 
were recent, still vivid lessons in the value of free speech; when all 
reporters aspired to be Woodward and Bernstein; when people 
actually watched the CBS Evening News and Walter Cronkite was 
“the most trusted man in America”; and when an old-school mistrust 
of governmental power was made flesh in a paranoid President with 
an enemies list and a secret black-ops unit operating out of the White 
House. Like Professor Gora, I too came of age in that time, and, as 
I’ve written previously,1 the fundamental First Amendment question 
of that day was how far to extend the boundaries of freedom of 
expression. Radicals like myself thought that there should be no 
boundaries at all. 
We live in a different time, however—one of viral emails, Fox 
News, Facebook and Twitter, and an ever-escalating flow of money 
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 1. Steven L. Winter, Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas, 64 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 965 (1993). 
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into the political system.2 According to the non-partisan Center for 
Responsive Politics, spending on the recent midterm elections is 
estimated at nearly $4 billion compared to $2.85 billion for the 2006 
midterm and the record $4.14 billion for the 2004 presidential 
campaign year. Outside spending in 2010 exceeded the previous 
record of $448 million set in 2004. Overall, Republican-leaning 
groups in this cycle outspent their Democratic counterparts by more 
than 2-to-1.3 And, as has been widely reported, the vast proportion of 
this spending has come from § 501 (c)(4) and (6) organizations that 
do not have to disclose their donors.4 
Much of this money was well-spent: the $36 million spent by Karl 
Rove’s two Crossroads groups in support of Republican candidates 
yielded a 58% success rate, while the $26 million spent by the 
Chamber of Commerce in support of Republicans yielded a success 
rate of 63%.5 These efforts were highly coordinated, with the 
                                                                                                                 
 2. To take a high-profile example, in 2004 Don Blankenship of Massey Coal spent $3 million to 
support the election of a state supreme court justice who then cast the deciding vote reversing a $50 
million judgment against Massey. The bulk of this money, $2.5 million, was spent entirely 
independently. His overall contribution was more than three times the amount spent by the candidate’s 
entire campaign. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257–58 (2009). In Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010), Justice Kennedy distinguished Caperton as “limited to the rule that the 
judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” But this remarkable 
formalist sleight of hand fails to rebut the factual premise of the constitutionally required recusal in 
Caperton—that independent expenditures create an appearance of corruption. Logically, if an 
appearance of corruption of this sort is sufficiently strong to constitute a due process violation, then it is 
hard to see why it should not suffice as a compelling governmental interest justifying congressional 
regulation. 
 3. Megan R. Wilson, Who’s Buying This Election? Close to Half the Money Fueling Outside Ads 
Comes From Undisclosed Donors, OPEN SECRETS BLOG, Nov. 2, 2010, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/whos-buying-this-election.html; Michael Beckel & Megan R. 
Wilson, Election 2010 Outside Political Spending Officially Eclipses Such Expenditures From 2004 
Cycle, OPEN SECRETS BLOG, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/10/breaking-
outside-spending-this-seas.html; Election 2010 to Shatter Spending Records as Republicans Benefit 
from Late Cash Surge, OPEN SECRETS BLOG, Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/ 
2010/10/election-2010-to-shatter-spending-r.html [hereinafter Shatter Spending Records]. See Editorial, 
Drowning in Campaign Cash, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2010, at WK 7. To put it in context, the top four 
conservative groups spent over $100 million while the top four liberal groups spent $38.6 million, with 
three-quarters of that amount coming from two unions. Shatter Spending Records, supra note 3. 
 4. Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain Secret As Rules Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
21, 2010, at A1; Shatter Spending Records, supra note 3. 
 5. Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right Flexed Muscles in House Races, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at P6. Some of the Chamber’s money was spent on Democratic candidates. Id. 
According to the Center, the Chamber spent $35 million overall. See also Shatter Spending Records, 
supra note 3. 
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Republican outside groups spending heavily on behalf of candidates 
who were underfunded relative to their Democratic opponents. As 
one media analyst remarked: “Republican groups basically provided 
the advertising version of bridge loans for the underfunded 
challengers, running ads before they could go up on the air for 
themselves . . . .”6 Because so much of this spending was by outside 
groups funded by anonymous donors, there was a flood of negative 
ads characterized by a sharply aggressive tone and exaggerated—if 
not false and misleading—claims.7 
Though it might be too much to say that all this was wrought by 
the Court’s decision in Citizens United,8 it is certainly true that it 
took place under its aegis. Not surprisingly, Americans 
overwhelmingly disapprove: in a poll just before the midterm 
elections, 80% of respondents said it was important to limit campaign 
spending (with Democrats and Independents more likely than 
Republicans to say it was very important) and 92% favored full 
disclosure.9 The experience of the recent elections and the negative 
reaction of the vast majority of Americans surely entitle us to ask 
whether the Court’s ruling was either necessary to or justified by our 
commitments to democracy and free speech. 
Plainly, the Court and its supporters think so. Yet, while the 
Court’s opinion in Citizens United is long on free speech rhetoric, it 
is painfully short on empirical data, social context, and constitutional 
vision.10 In his symposium paper, Professor Gora argues that the 
decision represents a victory for free speech and for democracy.11 
“First-Amendment rights,” he says, “should be unified, universal, and 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Michael Luo, Democrats Outspend G.O.P. in TV Ads in House Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, 
at A17. See Luo & Palmer, supra note 5 (“In many cases, the Republican-oriented groups got involved 
in the races early on, battering Democratic candidates with negative advertisements, helping to set the 
tone in those districts, even if Democratic candidates and their allies were eventually able to outspend 
them.” (quoting Evan Tracey, President of the Campaign Media Analysis Group)). 
 7. Luo & Palmer, supra note 5. 
 8. Citizens United v. Federal Elect. Comm., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 9. Megan Thee-Brennan, Americans Want Disclosure and Limits on Campaign Spending, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/americans-want-disclosure-and-
limits-on-campaign-spending/?scp=2-b&sq=campaign+spending&st=nyt. 
 10. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Today’s 
decision . . . elevates . . . assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality.”). 
 11. Joel Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. STATE UNIV. L. REV. 935 (2011). 
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indivisible.”12 But one cannot assess the likely impact of Citizens 
United on our democracy without a clear understanding of the 
dynamics of modern mass media culture and its impact on 
contemporary politics. Beyond that one would need: first, a theory of 
free speech; second, a theory of truth or, at least, of how people come 
to hold the beliefs they do; third, a theory of democracy; and, fourth, 
a decent socio-legal understanding of corporate behavior. All this is 
strikingly absent both from the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United 
and from Professor Gora’s spirited defense of its ruling. There is little 
of the analysis that might help us think about the deeper questions of 
corporate citizenship and of the democratic sustainability of our 
current political system. 
“The First Amendment,” Professor Gora says, “has always been 
based on the idea that the more speech we have, the better off we are, 
as individuals and as a people.”13 Not quite. As a historical and 
conceptual matter, there have been not one, but several First 
Amendments based on different normative underpinnings and 
different conceptions of truth. For the Framers, who held a strong 
view of Truth, it seemed perfectly reasonable to punish false speech 
after the fact. Thus, the chief innovation of the founding period was 
the notion that truth should operate as a defense to seditious libel—a 
reform carried forward in Section 3 of the Sedition Act. Even 
Jefferson, an opponent of the Sedition Act, had no qualms about 
referring what he considered offensive falsehoods for prosecution by 
state authorities. Justice Holmes, in contrast, held a Darwinian 
conception of truth as that which emerges from the contest of views. 
We are all familiar with his claim that the “the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas.”14 But his was not the 
Miltonian faith that no one “ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a 
free and open encounter.”15 His, rather, was the more cynical 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 939. 
 13. Id. at 940. 
 14. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
 15. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicenc’d 
Printing. To the Parlament of England (1644), in THE PROSE OF JOHN MILTON 265, 327–28 (J.M. 
Patrick ed. 1967) (all spellings as in original). 
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understanding “that truth was the majority vote of that nation that 
could lick all others.”16 Holmes viewed free speech as a no-holds 
barred competition between vigorously contested views that must 
ultimately yield to “the dominant forces of the community.”17 Justice 
Brennan’s more liberal version of unbridled free speech, in contrast, 
championed the idea that “debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”18 and characterized by “the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources.”19 
But we do not live in 1644, 1789, 1919, or 1964. We live in a 
media age in which the insight that truth is socially constructed has 
become a practical axiom. There are now a multitude of social and 
political institutions that wield ever more sophisticated ways of 
designing, marketing, and disseminating images and other symbolic 
forms through ever faster and ever more pervasive technologies of 
communication. The Citizens United Court seems to think that this is 
a good thing or, at least, that corporations will helpfully identify 
errors and fallacies that would otherwise go undetected.20 Yet, every 
day truth is put to the worse. According to a Newsweek poll, 31% of 
all Americans and 52% of all Republicans think that President 
Obama is a secret Muslim or sympathetic to the jihadi project of 
imposing Sharia law worldwide.21 Between 20% and 27% of all 
Americans22 and 51% of Republicans likely to vote in the 2012 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918). 
 17. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 18. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 19. Id. at 266 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
 20. Citizens United v. Federal Elect. Comm., 130 S. Ct. 876, 912–13 (2010). 
 21. Daniel Stone, Democrats May Not Be Headed for Midterm Bloodbath, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 
2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/27/newsweek-poll-democrats-may-not-be-headed-for-
midterm-bloodbath.html. The raw data is posted online at http://nw-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/1004-
ftop.pdf. Question 24 asked: “Some people have alleged that Barack Obama sympathizes with the goals 
of Islamic fundamentalists who want to impose Islamic law around the world.  From what you know 
about Obama, what is your opinion of these allegations?” While 7% of all respondents said “definitely 
true” and 24% said “probably true,” the corresponding numbers among Republicans were 14% and 38%. 
 22. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Defining Obama, Misperceptions Stick, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, at 
A19. 
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primaries23 believe that Obama was not born in the United States, 
even though his birth certificate is posted online.24 The Court 
observes: “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to 
use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened 
self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”25 And it 
confidently affirms its First Amendment faith, “entrusting the people 
to judge what is true and what is false.”26 But where is that 
enlightened and informed electorate? What has happened to its 
capacity to consider factual claims and accept or reject them on the 
merits? What has happened to our naive faith in the marketplace of 
ideas? 
In his book, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance, 
Steve Shiffrin warns against monolithic theories of free speech. There 
are, he points out, “a host of First Amendment values”27 that include 
tolerance; liberty; self-governance; the dignity, equality, and 
autonomy of all individuals; the value of self-expression and self-
realization; and Emersonian Romanticism. Each of these normative 
conceptions asks us to think about free speech in a different way; 
each leads to very different conclusions about the place of corporate 
speech under the First Amendment. I do not have the time to draw 
them all out here, but the two most obvious implication are: first, that 
free speech is a quality of flesh-and-blood humans whose liberty, 
dignity, and self-realization the First Amendment was meant to 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Romney and the Birthers, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING, Feb. 15, 2011, 
http://publicpolicypolling.blogspot.com/2011/02/romney-and-birthers.html; Tim Rutten, Behind the 
‘Birther’ Blather, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A17. 
 24. See, e.g., http://factcheck.org/elections-2008/born_in_the_usa.html; 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2008/06/obama-birth.html; 
http://fightthesmears.com/articles/5/birthcertificate. On Wednesday, April 27, 2011. President Obama 
released his “long form” birth certificate. Michael D. Shear, Citing ‘Siliness,’ Obama Shows Birth 
Certificate, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2011, at A1. “No sooner had President Obama released his long-form 
birth certificate than Orly Taitz, the doyenne of the '’birther'’' movement, found reason to doubt it.” Kate 
Zernike, Conspiraces Are Us, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at WK1. 
 25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. Similarly, Professor Gora observes that “no one seriously 
disputes . . . that the primary purpose of the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech, press, 
assembly and petition is to enhance democracy by insuring an informed electorate capable of governing 
its own affairs.” Gora, supra note 11, at 961. 
 26. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907. 
 27. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5–6 (Harvard 
University Press 1990). 
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protect, and, second, that free speech is one of the defining aspects of 
citizenship and, thus, a characteristic not of commercial enterprises 
but of self-governing legal subjects. I will say more about these in a 
moment. Suffice it to say that for-profit corporations do not fare well 
under either of these understandings. 
In a parallel vein, Ed Baker’s Media, Markets, and Democracy 
reminds us that there is more than one theory of democracy, and the 
different theories provide different answers to the questions of what 
type of free speech we need and why.28 Elite or Schumpeterian 
democratic theory sees democracy as a system in which policy elites 
compete for the approval of the masses who, truth be told, could not 
be bothered by the complexity, difficulty, and time-consuming nature 
of actual self-governance. On this view, the role of a free speech 
regime is to provide information and transparency—that is, to serve a 
“checking function” on accrued, corrupt, or ineffective governmental 
power.29 Independence is the key characteristic of this model of free 
speech. Liberal or pluralist democratic theorists view democracy as a 
competition between individuals and groups over divergent interests, 
values, and conceptions of the good. The results of these conflicts are 
aggregated through voting and mediated by bargaining and 
compromise (particularly in the legislative process, but also in the 
electoral process of forming coalitions). On this view, the role of the 
First Amendment is to guarantee that individuals and the interest 
groups to which they belong receive adequate information about 
when their interests are at stake and about how and when to mobilize 
to defend them. The key characteristics of this model of free speech 
are the independence and diversity of informational sources. 
Contemporary civic republicans, such as myself, understand 
democratic self-governance not on the model of an individual right, 
like the right to liberty or property, but as an unavoidably communal 
enterprise in which we share with others the authority to decide the 
                                                                                                                 
 28. C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 125–213 (Cambridge University Press 
2002). 
 29. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
521, 521–649 (1977). 
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conditions of social life.30 This requires participation, mutual 
recognition and respect, and conditions of solidarity in dealing with 
the problems of our collective existence—what, in classical 
republican theory, is expressed in terms of the res publica or the 
“common good.” On this view, the role of a free speech regime is to 
promote the conditions necessary for the deliberative discourse that 
constitutes collective self-governance. Independence and diversity—
though now in the form of inclusive participation—remain 
desiderata. But, on this model of free speech, fragmentation, 
excessive partisanship, and overtly strategic communication are 
absolutely deadly to democracy. The key characteristics of this model 
are a reflective, inclusive public discourse that respects differences 
and promotes responsibility and solidarity. 
This listing is not exhaustive. I have passed over both classical 
republican theory and Baker’s own “mixed” conception, which 
thoughtfully combines elements of pluralist and classical republican 
democratic theory.31 Each yield different conceptions of the free 
speech that a democratic polity would require. The overall point 
should be clear: One cannot say that a particular ruling or practice is 
“a win for democracy” without both saying what you mean by 
democracy and explaining why that particular democratic vision is 
normatively superior. Even then, one would have to show that one’s 
normative claim is either accurately descriptive of or, at least, 
empirically plausible under modern conditions. 
Perhaps I am making too much of this silence. Surely, we can infer 
that it is a liberal pluralist view that animates the Citizens United 
decision and that Professor Gora is defending here. Thus, the Court 
says that “it is inherent in the nature of the political process that 
voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in 
order to determine how to cast their votes.”32 So too, it notes that 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Steven L. Winter, Reimagining Democracy for Social Individuals, 46 ZYGON: J. RELIGION 
AND SCI. (forthcoming 2011). 
 31. BAKER, supra note 28, at 143–47. I have also left out postmodern conceptions of democracy 
(which, in my view, offer an important complement to contemporary republicanism) such as Chantal 
Mouffe’s “agonistic pluralism.” See, e.g., CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (Verso 
2000). 
 32. Citizens United v. Federal Elect. Comm., 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). 
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“[f]actions should be checked by permitting them all to speak.”33 But 
there is an equivocation that runs through both the Court’s opinion 
and Professor Gora’s paper, which undermines this otherwise 
obvious conclusion. 
The dominant motif of the Court’s opinion is, as Justice Stevens 
observes in dissent, the extensive (one might say, obsessive) 
repetition of the “glittering generality” that the First Amendment 
prohibits “distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, including its 
‘identity’ as a corporation.”34 In much the same vein, Gora argues 
that free speech rights “should be available to all those individuals 
and groups which seek to exercise them.”35 At the same time, both 
maintain that it is “the importance of the speech, not the identity of 
the speaker” that determines protection.36 Thus, the Court observes 
that “the worth of speech ‘does not depend upon the identity of its 
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.’”37 
And Gora insists: “We protect the speaker to protect the speech.”38 
I raise this ambiguity for two reasons. First, the argument for the 
primacy of the speech over the speaker is the traditional hallmark of a 
civic republican approach. As Alexander Meiklejohn remarked: “The 
First Amendment . . . does not require that . . . every citizen shall take 
part in the public debate. . . . What is essential is not that everyone 
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”39 It 
matters here because what is at issue in the campaign finance debate 
is not the substance of the speech, but its provenance. It is not just, in 
the case of restrictions on campaign expenditures, that there are other 
people out there saying the same things; it is, rather, that the same 
speaker can say exactly the same thing as long as he/she/it does so at 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 907. 
 34. Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 35. Gora, supra note 11, at 950. 
 36. Id. at 951. 
 37. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
777 (1976)). 
 38. Gora, supra note 11, at 951. 
 39. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (Harper 
& Brothers 1948). 
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an earlier time or using a different legal form.40 The Court in Citizens 
United observes that, “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of 
the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”41 But 
that is not at all what is at stake here. 
Second, and this goes to the heart of the argument, the systematic 
conflation of speaker and speech is a rhetorical device that allows the 
Court and its defenders to have their cake and eat it too. “The civic 
discourse,” the Court says, “belongs to the people.”42 But who are 
“the people” when it is a corporation that speaks? The Court extols 
the citizens’ right to use the information as they see fit in the exercise 
of “enlightened self-government.” But a corporation is an economic 
entity, not a citizen; a profit-making enterprise, not an enlightened 
intelligence; a creature of the law, not a partner in a democratic 
project of political self-governance. The Court’s rejoinder is—in 
effect—that it is the speech, not the speaker that matters. At the same 
time, however, the Court misappropriates the moral attributes of 
personhood when it argues that restrictions on corporate speech are a 
form of discrimination: “By taking the right to speak from some and 
giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged 
person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, 
standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”43 Worth and standing 
are qualities of persons; so, too, respect is a moral obligation that one 
owes to other human beings. 
Gora employs just the same rhetorical sleight of hand when he 
argues that corporations cannot be treated as second-class citizens or 
“political untouchables.”44 “A ‘caste system’ with privileged 
speakers and pariah speakers,” he says, “is anathema to First 
Amendment principles.”45 But these kinds of dignitary harms are 
                                                                                                                 
 40. In a second remarkable bit of formalism, the Court explains that § 441b is a restriction on 
corporate speech even though the corporation is free to form a PAC for that purpose because “[a] PAC is 
a separate association from the corporation.” Citizens United v. Federal Elect. Comm., 130 S. Ct. 876, 
897 (2010). 
 41. Id. at 899. 
 42. Id. at 917. 
 43. Id. at 899. 
 44. Gora, supra note 11, at 945. 
 45. Id. at 969. 
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unique to persons, not abstract legal entities. To get a proper sense of 
the distortion, consider your reaction if I said that Ralph Nader or 
Michael Moore is “racist against corporations.” If you did not think 
me odd, you would assume that I was speaking metaphorically. 
But that’s the point: Money is not speech, though it can be a useful 
instrument in getting speech heard. A corporation is not a person, 
though it is an effective vehicle for accomplishing various human 
purposes. Gora, at least, acknowledges this. But then he asserts that 
because corporations “are made up of, run by and embody the 
interests and concerns of real people” they should get the same 
rights.46 But this a monumental fudge. First, he is once again shifting 
his ground from the argument that it is the speech and not the 
speaker; he explicitly invokes the interests and concerns of flesh-and-
blood humans to justify the free speech rights that, he claims, should 
not be restricted to real people. Second, he is eliding entirely the 
question that lies at the heart of the objection to Citizens United: 
What are the interests and concerns of the real people who make up 
the corporation? When we are talking about an advocacy-oriented, 
not-for-profit like the ACLU or Citizens United, it is precisely the 
protected speech interests of flesh-and-blood humans at issue. But 
when we are talking about a commercial corporation such BP or 
Halliburton, the interests and concerns of the people who staff the 
corporation and speak for it are entirely irrelevant. The corporation 
has only one interest, and it is mandated both by the market and by 
law: to maximize the return on the shareholders’ investment.47 
As Justice Stevens points out in dissent, the commercial 
corporation is not at all like a real person.48 It is not interested in self-
realization. It finds no inherent value in self-expression. It could not 
care less about Emersonian romance. It has no loyalty to its 
employees or community that is not trumped by the bottom-line. If it 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at 954. 
 47. Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s Dilemma, 27 
GA. STATE UNIV. L. REV. 1105 (2011). 
 48. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court dramatically overstates 
its critique of identity-based distinctions, without ever explaining why corporate identity demands the 
same treatment as individual identity. Only the most wooden approach to the First Amendment could 
justify the unprecedented line it seeks to draw.”). 
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is more cost-effective, it will outsource its jobs or relocate its 
factories abroad because its sole concern is profit. In short, the real 
people whose dignity and self-governance we care about are complex 
moral beings. The commercial corporation is a single-purpose entity 
that, in a word, is not an object of citizenship. 
In Chicago, there is a statute of George Washington flanked by 
Robert Morris and Haym Salomon.49 My bet is that most readers 
have never heard of Haym Salomon. He was a Polish Jew who 
immigrated to New York in the mid-1770s. He was a financial 
broker, a member of the Sons of Liberty, arrested by the British as a 
spy during the Revolutionary War, and an expert broker who worked 
with Morris to finance the American Revolution.50 Estimates put his 
loans to the fledgling nation at $800,000 in 18th Century dollars.51 
When Washington needed $20,000 to march the troops to Yorktown 
and the Treasury was empty, legend has it that his four-word dispatch 
read: “Send for Haym Salomon.”52 According to the legend, Salomon 
had lent so much money to the government that he died broke. 
Although the reality was more complex, his descendents did petition 
Congress unsuccessfully for repayment of some of the loans.53 
Why do I mention him? Does anyone in his or her wildest 
imagination think that Halliburton would similarly underwrite the 
War in Iraq? Given our whopping deficits, would it rebate to the 
                                                                                                                 
 49. In their brief in Buckley v. Valeo, Professor Gora and his co-authors invoked the financial 
contributions of Robert Morris and Haym Salomon to the Revolutionary War cause in support of their 
argument that campaign expenditures are a form of free speech. Brief of the Appellants at 122–23, 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (Nos. 75–436, 75–437). From a practical standpoint, of course, the 
“campaign” they helped underwrite was a military one; from a legal standpoint, what they were engaged 
in was not free speech but treason. Presumably, no one thinks that financial contributions to a military 
group committed to overthrowing the existing legal government is protected by the First Amendment. 
Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 50. JACOB RADER MARCUS, EARLY AMERICAN JEWRY, VOLUME 2: THE JEWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 
AND THE SOUTH, 1655-1790, at 132–54, 161–64 (Jewish Publication Society of America 1953); 
LAURENS R. SCHWARTZ, JEWS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HAYM SALOMON AND OTHERS 5–114 
(McFarland & Co., Inc. 1987). 
 51. MARCUS, supra note 50, at 134. In fact, he was instrumental in floating at least $200,000 in 
securities on behalf of the Revolutionary cause. He also made personal loans (for which he refused 
repayment) to an impecunious James Madison while the latter served in the Continental Congress in 
Philadelphia. Id. at 164; SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 65–66. 
 52. Donald N. Moran, Haym Salomon—The Revolution’s Indispensable Financial Genius (1999), 
http://www.revolutionarywararchives.org/salomon.html. 
 53. MARCUS, supra note 50, at 132, 162. 
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United States some of the billions in profits it earned during that war? 
A First Amendment that equates corporations like Halliburton with 
citizens like Haym Salomon is not “unified, universal, and 
indivisible,” but dangerously oversimplified. 
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